

**Canadian International Development Agency**

**Diagnostic study of the  
Poverty Reduction Strategy Monitoring and Evaluation Systems in  
Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Niger**

**Synthesis/Summary of study's  
key findings**

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## **1.1. Context of mandate**

At the end of 2001, in the framework of the "PRSP Review", the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and several other donors carried out preliminary reviews of the experience accumulated to date in implementing the Poverty-Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). The main observation to emerge from these exercises was that PRSP monitoring/evaluation constituted one of the main problem areas to which special attention would need to be paid in the years to come. This observation was confirmed by the African countries, which expressed over the course of several conferences and seminars the need for support in putting in place PRSP monitoring and evaluation systems.

Mindful of these difficulties, certain donors are looking into the possibility of providing support for institutional frameworks for PRSP monitoring and evaluation. Several projects are already up and running, and recently the PRS Monitoring System Task Team of the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) announced that it would conduct a research and analysis study based on case studies aimed at helping implement effective national systems for monitoring and assessing the PRSPs. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) decided to contribute to this exercise by commissioning the present study, a diagnostic analysis of the monitoring/evaluation mechanisms in five French-speaking countries of Western Africa, namely Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin.

## **1.2 Roles and issues concerning monitoring/evaluation mechanisms**

Implementation of complex strategies such as poverty-reduction strategies represents a major challenge for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC). First, a number of them do not have institutional mechanisms for poverty-related information management, and second, their capacities are seriously deficient when it comes to the conceptual and analytic complexity associated with the issue of poverty. Information systems are in place, to be sure, but in certain instances and to varying degrees they reveal certain chronic weaknesses and are often hard-pressed to carry out all the tasks for which they are responsible.

By the end of the formulation stage, the recipient countries must implement these strategies and monitor their implementation as well as the progress achieved in reducing poverty. In this case, this monitoring fits in with the mechanisms for managing the implementation process and, accordingly, plays a leading role for a number of reasons:

- it makes it possible to verify, as the process moves along, to what extent implementation is conforming to the action plans in the various intervention sectors/fields and to what extent the expected results are being achieved at various periods;
- it provides the responsible authorities, from the standpoint of the policies and overall management of the PRSP implementation as well as the various implementation levels and components, with regular access to relevant diagnostic elements and information, which they can use to guide their actions and direct their efforts with an eye to constantly improving the management of the process by

determining what is yielding the expected results and what is proving to be less successful and in need of adjustment;

- it plays an important role with regard to the mutual commitments made between the recipient countries and the bilateral and multilateral development partners as part of the HIPC initiative. Monitoring is part and parcel of results-based management, based on a logical framework approach to public action policies and programs.

### 1.3 Monitoring mechanism structure

The PRSP implementation and monitoring mechanisms differ markedly according to the country. Some were already outlined when the process got underway, at the same time and in relation to the PRSP preparation process. To varying degrees, all are still in need of clarification, particularly from a functional standpoint. This being the case, these mechanisms can be seen as variations developed around a basic structure.

- In each country, the monitoring function deals with a series of selected indicators. The production of data and PRSP monitoring indicators comes under the structures forming the **National Statistics System**, i.e. mainly the ministerial departments (Planning and Study Divisions, regional branches), the National Statistical Office (or equivalent), and the thematic observatories, including the Observatory for Sustainable Human Development (OSHD). Generally, these structures are already in place.

#### **Adaptation issues for the National Statistics Systems**

*According to the structures, adequate integration into the PRSP monitoring system poses adaptation requirements and issues of varying degrees in terms of their organization, operation and capacities. In some sectors, many of the identify indicators are already, in theory, part of the established mandate of a given ministry or of the national statistics office (or equivalent). However, in many cases their capacities and their monitoring mechanisms are still not adapted to the coordination and delivery requirements in connection with the PRSP monitoring mechanism. Furthermore, in some sectors that are traditionally ill-equipped from a statistics standpoint and in more recent areas of interest in terms of public affairs management, there remains, in general, little in the way of measurement or monitoring of the PRSP indicators.*

The other components of the PRSP monitoring mechanisms are primarily decision-making and technical entities that were put in place when the PRSP approach was adopted. These generally include:

- a series of **PRSP thematic groups** which are participatory technical entities. The establishment of these groups is in line, from an organizational standpoint, with the spirit and nature of the PRSP approach, which is intended to be comprehensive and participatory. Each of these groups brings together the representatives of the main

administrative bodies, civil society organizations, social partners, municipal stakeholders, as well as technical and financial partners.

In terms of monitoring, these groups are required to prepare semi-annual and annual progress reports in their respective fields. In theory, these reports constitute the source material used to prepare the overall annual progress report, once they are categorized, harmonized, integrated and synthesized. They incorporate the sectoral indicators provided by the concerned structures of the National Statistics System.

In most of the countries, the broad participatory vocation of the PRSP approach is also reflected in the establishment of regional participatory platforms for consultation, in the form of **PRSP regional committees**. These committees are also required to help monitor the PRSPs by preparing reports/documents on developments in their respective regions, the results of PRSP implementation and the diagnostic elements and recommendations they want to see highlighted.

- Overall monitoring of PRSP implementation and its impact are generally the responsibility of a **Steering or supervision committee**. Depending on the country, this is either an interdepartmental entity or a participatory body which also encompasses representatives of civil society organizations, social partners and eventually municipal stakeholders as well as technical and financial partners. This committee is generally tasked with ensuring the proper implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), monitoring the results and overseeing the actions to take and those taken to improve the overall management of the process.
- To that end, the Committee is supported by a **PRSP technical secretariat** which can perform several functions:
  - ensure that PRSP implementation is properly coordinated;
  - ensure that the monitoring mechanisms are properly coordinated;
  - prepare the annual PRSP comprehensive progress reports using the thematic, regional, ministerial and statistical reports transmitted to the Steering or Supervision Committee;

Its role is also to diagnose and see to the needs in terms of capacity enhancement for PRSP monitoring, and to see to the planning and funding of the capacity enhancement actions provided for.

In the case of Mali, the function of coordinating the PRSP implementation and monitoring is entrusted to a specific unit (attached to the office of the Minister responsible for the Economy and Finance), the Technical Secretariat being responsible for preparing the annual progress reports.


Depending on the country, the Technical Secretariat is either a new, separate structure or an existing one (e.g. the Planning and Study Division of the Ministry of Economy and Finance).

Graph 1 (below) illustrates the type of structure planned or in place in the five countries covered by the study. For simplification, the graph only presents the linkages relating to the information supply system with an eye to the production of monitoring reports.

The “demand” aspect concerning the PRSP monitoring information is depicted in Graph 2, through the identification of the main potential users of this information. In general, little attention is paid to this aspect in the documents presenting the various countries’ mechanisms.

While there is generally a desire to systematize and instrumentalize the monitoring (according to the results-based management approach), systematic application of the logical framework approach in terms of policy and program formulation remains underutilized in the working methods of the ministerial departments. Where the other actors are concerned, especially civil society, their needs in terms of information users are not always well identified. This often goes hand in hand with the difficulties encountered by many of them in spelling out their needs. For example, these organizations consider that the monitoring information must enable them to better determine their strategies and action plans and to facilitate their effective contribution to the consultation platforms. Some organizations feel that above all, they have a role to play in disseminating the information and raising awareness among the populations.


**Table 1. Standard flow chart depicting information production systems and PRSP monitoring reports**



(1) This function is carried out by a Cell specific to Mali

(2) The Technical Secretariat is eventually assigned to the *DNP /DEP du MEF* (e.g. Mali), but even when a separate entity is involved, the annual progress report is, in fact, generally produced by the *DNP ou la DEP des MEF*

**Graph 2. Potential users of monitoring information**



#### **1.4 Putting in place an effective monitoring/evaluation mechanism: a major challenge for recipient countries and their development partners**

Adequate monitoring requires a good enough comprehensive information system to be able to provide, assemble and integrate in a timely and regular manner a series of reliable and sufficiently comprehensive data *so that a valid vision can emerge of the progress in implementing the strategy, in the various applicable fields/sectors and in an overall sense.*

Adequate monitoring also requires the existence of functional mechanisms through which the results are effectively used to help enhance the efficiency of the implementation process. Most of the countries, however, lack the institutional/operational capacities and information systems needed to perform this type of monitoring.

Generally, the mechanisms already in place do not appear up to the task of ensuring the production of annual progress reports and evaluation reports responding to the expectations according to the indicators established at the outset and all the objectives set for the strategy. Even though some support activities are already provided for, a comprehensive capacity enhancement plan is usually lacking. Furthermore, the expected results of the planned actions are not defined in a sufficiently clear or precise manner. Accordingly, the general expectation is that the progress reports will be incomplete and not very helpful in conveying a proper understanding of the progress achieved.

Because of the shortcomings in diagnosing the systems in place, defining the expected monitoring products and planning the capacity enhancement activities, it is difficult to determine in an operational manner just what the “expected performance” levels are for the monitoring system, its “current performance” level and what would be attainable with the planned support according to the various reporting time frames<sup>1</sup>.

The observations concerning the gaps between “expected” and “attainable” performance include the following:

- the list of indicators has yet to be clearly established (comprehensively and/or according to deliverables deadlines);
- the periods at which the mechanisms should be able to deliver the various indicators have yet to be clearly established;
- the expected monitoring performance and the annual progress report formats are, in many cases, still too fuzzy;
- a sufficiently complete and precise diagnosis of the capacities of the monitoring mechanisms in place is still lacking;
- the data is not reliable or recent enough to establish the benchmark situation relative to some of the indicators.

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<sup>1</sup> “Performance level” of the monitoring system can be taken to mean the proportion of all the indicators that this system can systematically deliver (i.e. regularly and in a timely manner) as well as its performance vis-à-vis various criteria such as the quality of the monitoring reports/analyses and the effective extent to which the monitoring elements are taken into account in managing the PRSP implementation process.

Graph 3 illustrates this lack of clarity as regards “attainable” performance (with and without the planned capacity-enhancement actions) and “expected” performance.


As the Burkina Faso example shows, after two years of implementation, it behooves the other countries preparing to make this commitment to clarify as soon as possible:

- the performance that is expected of the monitoring system (indicators measured against the various deadlines);
- the reporting format;
- the capacity enhancement priorities, according to a vision of all the needs;
- planning for the actions that are then required (planned and additional actions);
- the resources required (those freed up from the State’s budget and the PRSP funds).

The very principle of results-based management requires ongoing monitoring on a periodic basis (quarterly, semi-annually or annually). For example, if it takes a year to benchmark certain indicators, it will not be possible to do the monitoring before year two. What’s more, the very act of setting the expected results must take account of the benchmark. The capacity enhancement actions take time to yield results (benchmarking that remains unavailable or incomplete, development of monitoring tools and of the corresponding instrumentation...).

Thus, there is an urgency to carrying out these planning tasks, because there are serious risks that the monitoring process will become sidetracked or lose credibility if the annual progress reports manage to provide the national and international decision-makers with only a partial or incomplete picture of the PRS’s expected results.

**Graph 3. Diagnostic elements for implementation of PRSP monitoring mechanisms: “expected” performance and “attainable” performance**



## **1.5 PRSP implementation and monitoring in the five countries covered by the study: diagnostic elements**

Among the five countries covered by the study, *Burkina Faso* has entered its third year of PRSP implementation, *Niger* launched it this year, *Mali* is preparing to do so, and *Côte d'Ivoire* and *Benin* are finalizing their PRSP.

In Burkina Faso, monitoring has proven to be somewhat of a failure after two years of implementation. It is haphazard and incomplete, and the first two annual progress reports are very hazy on what was actually implemented and the results that were attained in terms of poverty reduction.

As for the four other countries, their situations differ to varying degrees according to the aspects being considered, but in terms of the current state of things and the needs to be met, the chances of assembling in short order, or even in the medium term, the conditions for effective monitoring seem very slim.

The summary table below highlights the main observations emerging from the diagnostic analysis of each of the countries in the study. An analysis of this table shows that beyond certain specificities, there is a recurrence of several common diagnostic elements, in particular:

### ***Representativeness***

On the whole, and this applies to each of the countries in the study, the representativeness of all the actors (government, civil society, private sector, development partners) was satisfactory during the PRS formulation stage. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, however, dissatisfaction was expressed in certain civil society quarters as to the conditions of their participation and the representativeness of the members.

As for the monitoring-evaluation mechanisms, the institutional frameworks provide for wide representation, but this has yet to be put to the test in practical terms. In this regard, the experience in Burkina Faso demonstrates the shortcomings in terms of operationalizing the participation of civil society. In this case, the roles and responsibilities which are to be assigned to civil society are not clearly established, nor are they understood by the concerned actors themselves. It is as much a matter of their eventual contribution to the system for producing monitoring information as it is of their participation in the dissemination process and the policy dialogue.

### ***Sectoral integration***

In general, the existence of the thematic groups gives rise to wide sectoral representation. In fact, certain thematic groups and certain ministerial departments seem to be more involved in the process, particularly in the fields of macroeconomics, public finance, health and education. This seems to be the case when it involves fields traditionally seen as being more directly associated with poverty reduction efforts, and where the attention of the development partners tends to focus. There is a sort of "implicit sectoral prioritization", justified to be sure, but at odds with the inclusive vocation of the PRSP approach. And in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the scope of the PRS dictates a very complex sectoral integration.

### ***Structure of the mechanisms***

In most cases, the monitoring-evaluation mechanisms have been outlined but not yet put to the test, with the exception of Burkina Faso, the only country to have a PRS monitoring-evaluation system up and running. On the whole, these are complex mechanisms requiring strong coordination but whose participatory nature the authorities wish to stress. In addition to governments, civil society organizations are, in theory, adequately represented. In practice, however, the experience in Burkina Faso seems to show that a lack of capacity prevents the actors from properly assuming their roles. These roles, like the mechanisms for participation by the various actors, still need to be fleshed out with more details, just as there is a need to strengthen the decentralized and devolved levels. These are weaknesses in the five mechanisms that were diagnosed.

The linkage between implementation and monitoring-evaluation is not always clear enough. Moreover, the “evaluation” is generally lumped in with the “monitoring”, and the need to have recourse to a sufficiently independent body does not emerge explicitly.

### ***Definition of roles***

Most of the countries have issued decrees on the overall organization of the institutional mechanisms for PRSP implementation and monitoring-evaluation, which define the mandates and functions of the main actors.

The role of most of the actors is defined clearly enough in these decrees, given the tendency of this type of regulatory text to establish a general framework. In each of the mechanisms, however, the definition of the roles fails to delineate with sufficient clarity the monitoring-evaluation responsibilities of certain key actors. Generally, this lack of clarity can be attributed to a failure to be specific enough about the subject and nature of the elements that these actors have to monitor and the products they have to deliver to ensure their contribution to the monitoring-evaluation system/mechanism. These roles should therefore be clarified (data and information production, analysis, coordination, dissemination, coordination) by means of additional regulatory instruments.

In a more general sense, each country needs to develop a more operational vision of the monitoring mechanism to go along with a clearer definition of the actors' roles and responsibilities in the form of specifications. In order to move forward, all the actors/structures concerned need to clearly define and establish the roles and responsibilities within their own organization (e.g. the various units concerned within each ministerial department).

### ***Ownership-internalization***

The wide participation that has generally taken place during the PRS formulation stage has gone hand in hand with a significant degree of “ownership” on the part of the various government and civil society stakeholders. That being the case, while most of the countries have recently begun to implement their PRS (or are getting ready to do so), the current conditions do not seem conducive to timely and satisfactory ownership of the monitoring function by the concerned civil society actors and governments. Indeed, when it comes to the governments, apart from some specific cases, the work methods are not yet adapted to the requirements of the PRS monitoring-evaluation. In fact, it seems that the sectoral ministries remain disinclined to reconsider their work methods from the vantage point of the priorities expressed in the PRSs. On the whole, and this includes among the civil society organizations,

the experience of shifting paradigms and national strategies over the past decades tends to elicit a degree of caution vis-à-vis the PRSP approach, which is perceived as new and which some still consider as another externally imposed initiative. Ownership of the monitoring function by the civil society organizations is also limited by the lack of clarity as to the role they would be required to play.

### ***Actual versus potential capacities***

With only a few exceptions, according to the countries (Côte d'Ivoire and Benin) or the sectors (public finance, education, health), the national statistics systems are somewhat dysfunctional. As things stand today, these systems can respond only partially to the demand for PRS monitoring information. In all the cases, capacity enhancement activities are required. Some have already been provided for (but their planning does not necessarily indicate the time frames within which the systems in question will be able to deliver the indicators on a regular, reliable basis).

From the standpoint of the ministerial departments, the quantitative and qualitative shortcomings in terms of human resources limit their capacity to adequately assume the monitoring role devolved to them. They are reflected not so much in the purely statistical competencies related to data production and processing as in the competencies associated with knowledge and operationalization of the monitoring instrumentation, approach and methods. This observation applies as well to the civil society organizations.

### ***Effective resources***

In all the countries covered by the study, insufficient financial and material resources represent a major impediment to the monitoring-evaluation functions: very few projects are being monitored, and the responsibility for this function more often than not falls to the donors rather than the supervisory authorities. In addition to the implementation of the poverty reduction strategies, the ministries' budget envelopes have not been increased with a view to marshalling additional resources for PRS monitoring-evaluation. Only Mali and Côte d'Ivoire have estimated the costs of monitoring and assessing their strategies, but these are overall envelopes with few details. It seems that the inability to clearly delineate the monitoring tasks and responsibilities to be carried out has made it difficult, in all the countries in the study, to accurately assess and calibrate the resources that should be marshalled to ensure adequate monitoring.

### ***Instrumentation***

The monitoring-evaluation instruments (logical frameworks, results-based management, project management cycle, software, etc.) are poorly understood and under-utilized by the governments and civil society organizations. The results-based management approach is misunderstood, particularly as regards *the ongoing monitoring of performance*. In fact, the monitoring-evaluation function has been poorly internalized within the governments, where it is looked on as a sanction rather than a decision-making tool. The analytical capacities are ill-suited to the requirements of the PRS and its management approach, and they could affect in the very short term the functionality of the monitoring-evaluation mechanisms in place if capacity enhancement actions are not taken. This is all the more evident in that few (if any) initiatives were undertaken during the preparation stage to equip the various actors with monitoring instruments and to train them with regard to the requirements and methods of results-based management.

### **Monitoring indicators**

A list of PRSP monitoring indicators has been drawn up in each country, apart from Benin. Given the high number of indicators on these lists, in each case a core list of higher-priority indicators has been identified. With regard to the encompassing mandate and nature of the PRSPs and the various thematic groups, a limited number of indicators has been selected for each field/sector.

Generally, the *required or expected* frequency of the availability of the measurements for the various indicators has been determined. Generally, however, the situation has not been established in a sufficiently systematic, clear and precise manner as regards (i) the existence and value of the data making it possible to establish benchmarks and expected results, and (ii) the capacity to produce these indicators in a timely and reliable manner (including in fields where capacity enhancement actions have been provided for).

In some sectors or ministerial departments traditionally better equipped in terms of data monitoring (usually the Economic and Finance Ministry and the ministries of education and health), the problems are perhaps not as serious. On the other hand, in other sectors that traditionally have fewer resources, are difficult to monitor or are new (rural development, environment, good governance...), an often sizeable gap must be recognized between the information that it would be useful and desirable to have to help monitor the PRSP, and the information that one might reasonably expect to have over the short and medium term, notwithstanding the capacity enhancement efforts that could be made.

If the monitoring function is to take hold, it seems necessary to further clarify from the outset the rules of the game, particularly by clearly establishing what series of indicators should indeed be found at such and such a period in the monitoring reports (and for which there should be an assurance of being able to produce). In this regard, if everyone recognizes the need to use “the results indicators” (in the short, medium and long term), at the same time it seems difficult, albeit indispensable, to maintain “process indicators”, particularly for monitoring the first years. A system providing for sliding programming of the indicators to follow as the process advances would be an option to consider.

The monitoring-evaluation function forms an intrinsic part of the overall PRS management system, in particular to help pilot these strategies. The overall effectiveness of the PRS implementation management (planned for periods from three to five years) requires the ability to carry out adequate monitoring as rapidly as possible in order to avoid being sidetracked. Systematizing the monitoring of results has represented a major challenge for all the large organizations and the countries that already make it a key element of their model and of their public management rules. Some of the more industrialized countries remain somewhat backward in this area. In the matter at hand, where one is dealing with developing countries plagued by major weaknesses in terms of information systems and capacities, where one is dealing with PRSPs which cover a broad range of sectors, and where the approach is new, there is a large gap between, on the one hand, the requirements that should in theory be met right away in order to effectively monitor the PRSPs and, on the other, the existing conditions and the time required to carry out the capacity enhancement actions that are necessary.


### ***Donor consultation***

Notwithstanding the existence of serious concerns relating to PRSP monitoring and the presence of dialogue platforms (eventually formal, as is the case in Mali, for example), implementation of monitoring-evaluation mechanisms is the subject of only a handful of very ad hoc initiatives on the part of certain donors. None of the countries in the study has an overall plan covering monitoring-evaluation capacity enhancement based on priorities established and recognized by the national authorities and all of the donors. Moreover, there are no mechanisms common to the donors for supporting these efforts, although, in the case of Burkina Faso, the idea is to put in place a multi-donor institutional support fund to finance monitoring actions. Certain differences in views among donors concerning which indicators to favour and the disbursement mechanisms seem to be holding back effective initiatives aimed at consultation and coordination.


### ***Support needs and types of interventions***


For each diagnostic element, a chart is presented below, indicating the main support needs that have been identified, the types of interventions required and the countries concerned. These charts are based on synthesized information on the countries, presented in the tables appearing in the Appendix.

## Participation of civil society, government and development partners



## Sectoral integration, structure of mechanisms, rivalries and definitions of roles





### Actual versus potential capacities and actual resources

#### Needs



- Systematize the monitoring / evaluation actions within the governments and civil society organizations



#### Interventions

- Human, materiel and financial capacity enhancement for monitoring system actors

#### Countries concerned

- Benin
- Burkina Faso
- Côte d'Ivoire
- Mali
- Niger





## **APPENDICES**

## **Appendix 1**

### **Synthesis of country diagnoses**

## Synthesis of country diagnoses

Niger	Côte d'Ivoire	Burkina Faso	Benin	Mali
<b>Participation by civil society, government and development partners</b>				
<p>Good representativeness in terms of strategy formulation. Advisory process put in place, bringing together all segments of society. As for the monitoring/evaluation mechanism, its composition had not yet been defined, but willingness on the part of the authorities to make it as broadly representative as possible.</p>	<p>Strong participation by civil society, government, private sector and development partners in terms of the PRS formulation with the creation of 10 thematic groups and the holding of several regional workshops. However, civil society sharply critical of its participation conditions and the representativeness of the members speaking on its behalf.</p> <p>In terms of the monitoring/evaluation mechanism, since it has yet to be put to the test, it is premature at this time to say how participatory it is. The planned institutional framework, while theoretical, guarantees the presence and participation of government, civil society and representatives of the private sector at all constituent levels.</p>	<p>At the formulation stage, the PRSP afforded an opportunity to launch a dialogue with almost all the development actors and mainly with civil society and the development partners.</p> <p>In terms of the monitoring/evaluation mechanism, civil society involved very little from the standpoint of active participation in the debates. The absence of permanent members within the GS and the CTS is undermining the continuity of the monitoring and the development of an institutional memory. The local actors should be made more aware of the PRSP process so that they can be led to play a leading role in the monitoring mechanism.</p>	<p>Consultation process for formulation which has satisfactorily involved the main government and civil society stakeholders. Monitoring/evaluation mechanism at the validation stage and not yet operational. Weak capacity on the part of the Departmental Monitoring Committees (CDS) to play the monitoring/evaluation role predicted for them at the local level.</p>	<p>Relatively broad and strong at the PRSP formulation level. In terms of implementation and monitoring, actors' role insufficiently fleshed out.</p>
<b>Sectoral integration</b>				
<p>Apart from the Department of Basic Education, the sectoral strategies of the other departments have yet to be refined. Absence of focal points on the part of the Statistics Bureau and National Accounts in the</p>	<p>In its current formulation, the DRSP is too broad and insufficiently targeted to fight poverty effectively. Requires complex institutional implementation in terms of the monitoring/evaluation mechanism.</p>	<p>Stronger integration through implementation of sectoral groups corresponding to the main planks of the poverty control strategy.</p>	<p>Strengthened through the active participation of the main sectoral departments in developing and monitoring/assessing the PRSP. Social departments (education, health, agriculture, environment and</p>	<p>Sectoral integration in terms of uneven and disparate monitoring/evaluation according to the sectors affected. The systems in place to produce data and indicators in the areas of public</p>

Niger	Côte d'Ivoire	Burkina Faso	Benin	Mali
departments, and lack of organizational links that could harmonize the approaches and the information needs.			hydraulics) more specifically involved from a monitoring/evaluation standpoint.	finance or education are more developed than those used to monitor rural development or the urban private sector.  <b>Matching with PRSP relatively well understood for some sectors (health, education), but less so for others (mines...).</b>
Mechanism structure				
Institutional anchoring defined in the main thrusts of the PRSP, but it remains to be fleshed out. Consideration still being given to the configuration, composition and operating procedures that should be given to the monitoring mechanism for the PRS.	Mechanism which adequately integrates the monitoring/evaluation function and gives enough room to all the actors: government, private sector, civil society. However, presence of numerous weaknesses, including being based on a complex implementation and interrelations, an ambitious deconcentration and centralization, a different institutional anchoring from that of the previous programs, poor visibility of the information networks and cooperation between actors who are unlikely over the short term to be able to adequately fulfil their missions.	Effective implementation of a poverty monitoring mechanism with a three-level hierarchy. Absence, however, of a strong linkage in terms of decentralization and deconcentration. Inoperational mechanism is dysfunctional on a number of levels: only a few sectoral groups are functional. Uneven quality of progress reports produced by the sectoral groups and of the annual implementation assessments.	The planned monitoring/evaluation mechanism is complex, requiring a strong coordination mechanism. Need to clearly define the responsibilities and level of intervention of each actor in order to ensure the future operability of the monitoring/evaluation mechanism.	The mechanism described in the final PRSP identifies the various components (administrative structures, committees, etc.) called on to play a role in the monitoring system and paints an overall picture of the distribution and linkages between the roles. The mechanism is adequately configured on the whole, based on the existing mechanism and broken in during the development phase. The roles and mechanisms still have to be clarified.
Rivalries				
There is little tradition of cooperation between departments. Technical services guard their prerogatives jealously. Absence of functional links between the various members of the national statistics system (SNS) and of dialogue between statistics producers and users.	Risks of rivalry between the <i>Premier Ministère</i> also in charge of development planning and the <i>Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances</i> which, it seems, has greater expertise and a better ability to pilot the monitoring/evaluation mechanism.	Good anchoring of the mechanism within the <i>Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances</i> . Following a split within this department, there is a risk of rivalries between certain divisions. Diffuse role of ONAPAD, particularly in terms of its compatibility with STC-PDES and INSD.	Risk of major rivalries between the <i>Ministère du Plan</i> and the <i>Ministère des Finances</i> . This could affect the operations of the <i>Commission Nationale pour le Développement et la Lutte contre la Pauvreté</i> (CNDLP) and the functionality of the monitoring mechanism as a whole. The institutional anchoring of the	No major issues in particular.

Niger	Côte d'Ivoire	Burkina Faso	Benin	Mali
			<i>Observatoire du Changement Social</i> could be a source of potential internal conflicts.	
Definition of roles				
<p>The roles and responsibilities of the various actors in monitoring/evaluation are not accurately defined and have not been agreed to by the various parties. Difficult to articulate an operational vision of the monitoring mechanism and to define the responsibilities of the various parties.</p>	<p>Regulatory instruments specifying the powers, duties and missions of the various actors. Nevertheless, specifications still need to be drawn up for the various statistical production structures in relation to the DRSP and the specific missions and specifications of the various actors in terms of PRS monitoring still need to be defined.</p>	<p>Roles, powers and duties of the three levels of the PRSP monitoring mechanism are marked out in the regulatory instruments. Insufficient coordination of all the actors involved in monitoring, and lack of specifications clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders.</p>	<p>Specifications need to be set for all the components of the monitoring mechanism, as well as terms of reference for each of the actors. Risk of non-operationality of all the structures due to potential overlap of the functions or ambiguity of the mandates.</p>	<p>Need to clarify the roles and mechanisms for effective participation by civil society in the monitoring/evaluation mechanism. There is also a need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various services in the monitoring systems within the departments. The roles must also be clarified between the DNP, ODHD, PRSP cell, DNSI and CAFPD.</p>
Schedule planning				
<p>No work schedule set, and directives not yet transmitted to the departments re: the frequency of the monitoring reports to produce.</p>	<p>Final PRSP not yet approved and monitoring mechanism not yet operational. No work schedule set and directives not yet transmitted to the departments re: the frequency of the monitoring reports to produce.</p>	<p>Scheduling for the various levels of the monitoring/evaluation mechanism rarely adhered to and unrealistic. Mechanism operationalized on an ad hoc basis, prompted by deadlines that must be met from time to time.</p>	<p>Monitoring mechanism not yet functional, and no work schedule or definite reporting timetable.</p>	<p>Mechanism is functional and operationalizable in terms of macroeconomic monitoring, public finances and social sectors. The coordination mechanisms have yet to be clarified. Linkage to be determined between the participatory component of the monitoring mechanism and the public administration component. The Observatoire du Développement Humain Durable needs to be rebuilt.</p>
"Ownership"/Internalization				
<p>Neither the technical departments</p>	<p>Unequal ownership/internalization</p>	<p>Clear deficiency in terms of</p>	<p>Implementation of the poverty</p>	<p>At both the government and civil</p>

Niger	Côte d'Ivoire	Burkina Faso	Benin	Mali
<p>nor the civil society representatives have adapted their work methods to the PRS monitoring/evaluation requirements. Moreover: (i) there has been no assessment as to the capacities of the various actors to assume their tasks and responsibilities under the monitoring mechanism; (ii) the information needs have not been clearly specified; (iii) there is no coordination mechanism enabling the actors to consult with one another and coordinate their actions; (iv) the list of indicators to follow by department has not yet been finalized; (v) the type, format, contents and frequency of the monitoring reports has not been established.</p>	<p>of the PRS within government and civil society. Sectoral departments belatedly involved in the PRSP development process, and unprepared to reconsider their work methods through the poverty reduction lens. Institutional anchoring of the PRSP focal point inappropriate in certain departments. Coordinating bodies of PRS monitoring not yet operational and actors unaware of what should be monitored, of what indicators to produce, of the type of analysis to carry out and of the format of the monitoring reports to prepare.</p>	<p>internalizing and taking ownership of the PRSP objectives, both in government and civil society. Apart from the main divisions of the <i>Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances</i> and the two social departments involved at the beginning (health and basic education), the departments are doing little to implement the monitoring mechanism. They are participating here and there, in a reactive manner. Their participating is dictated primarily by report production deadlines.</p>	<p>reduction strategy not yet underway, and ownership/internalization has yet to be tested. However, genuine willingness in the sectoral departments to put in place internal monitoring systems with a view to preparing to assume the monitoring tasks. Attempts to change the work methods and adapt them to the PRSP monitoring requirements.</p>	<p>society level, there has often been a cautious attitude toward the PRSP, which is seen as an exercise imposed from on high and the outside. Weak integration in terms of the monitoring mechanism.</p>
<b>Actual versus potential capacities</b>				
<p>National Statistics System is deficient, in that it lacks the capacity to respond adequately to the demand for information that PRS monitoring will generate. As for government, apart from a few technical departments, the monitoring/evaluation capacities are very weak. The actors need to be upgraded.</p>	<p>Situation varies according to the structures involved. Relatively good capacities at the Institut national de la statistique. But in the sectoral departments, the deficient human, materiel and financial resources are impairing their capacities to adequately assume the role devolved to them. The national civil service is utterly destitute, and there is little chance that the country will develop the capacity overnight to manage the PRSP. As for civil society, the organizations are young and inexperienced in implementing and monitoring/assessing projects.</p>	<p>Statistical mechanism is poorly coordinated. INSD's difficulties mainly linked to the high mobility of its staff, the reduced internal capacities for data analysis and the insufficient financial resources to pay for costly data collection operations. Monitoring/evaluation services are poorly developed in the departments, and the human resources assigned to this function are generally insufficient in number and poorly trained in monitoring methods.</p>	<p>Technical capacities are present in the statistical bodies. There is a need, however, to maintain and strengthen competencies in data collection, data processing methods and analysis, particularly at the deconcentrated level. In the departments, there has been little effort to take ownership of the monitoring/evaluation tools and techniques.</p>	<p>There has been a degree of ownership/internalization of the monitoring mechanisms within the <i>Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances</i> and the health and education departments; capacity enhancement efforts are underway. Most of the other departments and civil society representatives have yet to adapt their work methods to the PRSP monitoring requirements. Although their awareness has been raised, most of the actors called on to contribute to the monitoring mechanism are taking a reactive approach. Results-based management approach misunderstood and seen as threatening by governments.</p>

Niger	Côte d'Ivoire	Burkina Faso	Benin	Mali
<b>Actual resources</b>				
<p>Insufficient human, financial and materiel resources to ensure adequate monitoring. To date, budgetary resources have yet to be set aside for the operation of the monitoring mechanism or for the upgrading of the monitoring/evaluation capacities of the various actors.</p>	<p>The costs inherent in the PRS monitoring/evaluation estimated at about 10 billion CFA Francs. These financial resources should come mainly from the funds obtained under the HIPC initiative and from contributions by development partners. Overall data not broken down according to activities considered.</p>	<p>Low allocation of human, materiel and financial resources by the DEP (<i>Directions des Etudes et la Planification</i>) in the technical departments. Consequently, the projects are not systematically monitored and, for lack of resources, few field visits are carried out to ensure that concrete results are being achieved. Parallel to the PRSP implementation, the departments' budgetary envelopes have not been increased with an eye to marshalling more resources to monitor the projects carried out under the HIPC initiative.</p>	<p>Insufficient human, materiel and financial resources of the technical departments, frequently resulting in postponements of monitoring/evaluation activities. The statistical activities of the INSAE and those initiated by the <i>Secrétariat Permanent</i> are entirely funded through outside assistance.</p>	<p>Amount of 4 billion CFA Francs entered under "PRSP implementation, analysis and monitoring/evaluation of poverty", which is 0.2% of the total funding set aside for the PRSP.</p> <p>Difficulty assessing the extent to which the resources set aside are adequately calibrated to ensure that monitoring responds to the expectations. Borders remain blurred between, on the one hand, operational and monitoring/evaluation capacity enhancement activities, and on the other, activities which should be carried out as part of other components of the program.</p>
<b>Instrumentation</b>				
<p>Poor control of monitoring tools by government and NGOs. As part of the PRS, no initiative has been taken to equip the various actors with monitoring instruments or to train them in monitoring/evaluation requirements and methods.</p>	<p>Project monitoring/evaluation instruments nonexistent and poorly controlled by staff in the departments. The notion of results-based management misunderstood. Lack of training for officials in charge of project evaluation. Poorly developed monitoring/evaluation culture within government; likened to a sanction, and not a decision-making tool. At both the deconcentrated and decentralized levels, the question of monitoring/evaluation is not really being debated yet.</p>	<p>Insufficient monitoring/evaluation analytical capacities affecting the functionality of the lowest level of the monitoring mechanism. Sectoral group members are insufficiently [sic – Translator] the monitoring issue and project instrumentation (logical frameworks, results-based management, project management cycle, software, etc.). No process undertaken to systematize monitoring within the sectoral groups and to standardize work methods. No uniformity in the contents of the reports produced, which makes it difficult to synthesize them at the higher level.</p>	<p>Insufficient and inappropriate instrumentation. Absence of social module in the MOSARE system (State revenues and expenditures) permitting linkage between poverty reduction and public finances. Slow integration of the PERAC mechanism which links means with results within the departments.</p>	<p>Poor (if any) grasp of the results-based management approach. Poor grasp as well of operationalization, particularly when it comes to ongoing performance monitoring framework. Poorly developed instrumentation and poorly defined/understood organizational and functional requirements. Notion of monitoring has negative connotations (sanction rather than management tool).</p>

Niger	Côte d'Ivoire	Burkina Faso	Benin	Mali
<b>Linkages</b>				
<p>Concentration of the implementation and monitoring in the <i>Secrétariat Permanent</i> of the PRS. Monitoring and evaluation functions linked with a high decision-making level, but no separation of monitoring and evaluation functions.</p>	<p>Distinction drawn in the final PRSP between implementation and monitoring. However, according to the proposed distribution of responsibilities, it is more a division of tasks than a separation of functions, since even though implementation and monitoring/evaluation come under different structures, both remain under the hierarchical authority of the National Supervision Committee.</p>	<p>No separation of implementation and monitoring/evaluation functions. Distribution of roles and responsibilities, particularly with regard to the functions of policy development, implementation and monitoring, is not of a type to guarantee an objective evaluation of the PRSP results.</p>	<p>Clear separation of the implementation and monitoring functions: the structures charged with assessing the impacts of the poverty reduction strategies (CAPE, private research offices, civil society organizations) are independent of the departments charged with implementing these policies.</p>	<p>Not enough distinction is drawn between the two functions. Risk of conflicts of interest.</p>
<b>Suitability of indicators</b>				
<p>On the whole, the indicators are not suited to assessing certain poverty situations, particularly the qualitative aspects. List of indicators needs to be improved. Need to introduce more disaggregation in order to gain a better understanding of the issues of urban-rural disparities and gender equality.</p>	<p>Two categories of indicators included, among them a hard core of 25. Good suitability on the whole, particularly as regards the indicators dealing with the population, public finances, agriculture, infrastructure, education and training, health and AIDS. Poor suitability, however, when it comes to the indicators dealing with gender and private sector development.</p>	<p>The indicators deal mainly with the social sectors (health and education). No reference to indicators relating to rural development sector (agriculture, water and environment, animal resources). The proposed indicators are based on national averages and are neither broken down nor regionalized, which limits their representativeness.</p>	<p>List of indicators not yet drawn up. Hard for statistical organizations to marshal the resources to identify the poverty target groups, monitor their situation and provide the information needed to develop policies concerning them.</p>	<p>The indicators are relevant and form a good basis for monitoring the PRSP, although they are not always clearly defined. Efforts to categorized the indicators have been undertaken (activity, result and impact indicators).</p> <p>The list of indicators has not been the subject of a true consensus. Strong potential for disputes. Misunderstandings fuelled by a poor grasp and a different understanding of the results-based management approach and its operationalization.</p>
<b>Indicator reliability</b>				

Niger	Côte d'Ivoire	Burkina Faso	Benin	Mali
<p>Problem of data availability. The current statistical databases are insufficient to meet the PRS monitoring and analysis needs. There is a need to carry out additional surveys.</p>	<p>Indicators available from government and statistical organizations in Côte d'Ivoire. Problem of quality in terms of regular updating and reliability due to weaknesses in the national statistical system.</p>	<p>Situation varies according to indicators. Relevance and reliability of macroeconomic indicators questionable. Production of national accounts interrupted for a number of years. In all sectors, the production of indicators on the basis of survey data requires support in order to ensure the quality and regularity of data collection, processing and analysis.</p>	<p>Lack of up-to-date information and statistics in a number of areas, particularly agriculture.</p> <p>Technical difficulty in the production of indicators in the various departments: lack of human resources and skills in the area of data processing and surveys.</p> <p>Distribution of tasks between the MAEP (responsible for ECVR) and INSAE (in charge of ELAM) for the household surveys poses various methodological problems, particularly in terms of periodicity, sampling and stratification of the samples.</p>	<p><b>Illustrative list stating the indicators, their source and their available production frequency. The production of many of these indicators does not seem to pose major problems, but the national information system does not seem able at this point to ensure adequate production of many of them.</b></p> <p>In certain fields (macroeconomic and budgetary, education, health), production on a regular and systematic basis of a good portion of the indicators appearing on the list for the PRSP monitoring/evaluation. For most of the other sectors, however, the existing mechanisms do not seem to have the capacity at this time to produce the monitoring indicators on a systematic and regular basis. Other indicators are new, and their production requires that the existing mechanisms be strengthened or new ones put in place.</p>
<b>Donor coordination</b>				
<p>There is no donor coordination framework. Little desire for donor coordination/harmonization in Niger.</p>	<p>Little in the way of coordination due to persistent disagreements among the main donors. Although a desire for coordination is talked about, the TFPs have not yet reached the stage where they are ready to coordinate their approach or harmonize their requests for information in terms of PRS monitoring.</p>	<p>Divergence of views among certain donors as to the disbursement mechanisms, the PRSP implementation schedules, the indicators to consider and the priority of the measures to support the poverty reduction strategy. Existence of a joint budgetary support group and possible implementation of an institutional support fund.</p>	<p>Reduced level of cooperation and coordination, which limits the possibility of developing joint actions.</p>	<p>Coordination mechanism in place and functional. Cooperation could be strengthened through the establishment of a joint fund aimed at strengthening the monitoring system.</p>



## **Appendix 2**

### **Synthesis of strengths and weaknesses**

### Synthesis of strengths and weaknesses

CRITERIA	BURKINA FASO		NIGER		BENIN		MALI		CÔTE D'IVOIRE	
	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks
<b>Participation:</b> - <b>Government</b> - <b>Civil society</b> - <b>Private sector</b>	Effective for government at the development stage	Absence of civil society at the development stage	Formulation level	Implementation and monitoring of actors' role undefined	Effective at development level (civil society participation thanks to support from Denmark-Netherlands), set place in the monitoring mechanism	Participation in monitoring mechanisms still not tested → risk	Effective at development stage		Private sector <sup>↑</sup> , PRSP formulation stage Strong participation by private sector at the formulation stage	Civil society is divided
<b>Sectoral integration</b>	Good sectoral integration (PRSP federative of sectoral policies) [sic – Translator]		Good representation		Strong sectoral integration		Very good sectoral integration of the programs that have already been developed		Strong involvement by the technical departments	Decentralization / deconcentration – too extensive, risk of non-operationality
<b>Actual versus potential capacities</b>		Insufficient, apart from a few sectoral levels (DEP, health), central and deconcentrated (all sectors)		Insufficient, apart from statistics, education, health, agriculture		Apart from INSAE, limited capacities		Apart from DNSI and CPS (health), weak technical capacities	√	Weak apart from the <i>Institut national de la statistique</i> and the <i>Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances</i>
<b>Actual resources:</b> - <b>financial</b> - <b>materiel</b> - <b>human</b>		Insufficient human, materiel and financial resources. High mobility in INSD and the DEP		Insufficient		Insufficient human and materiel resources		Human and materiel resources very insufficient		Insufficient, except for the INS
<b>Instrumentation</b>		Insufficient and often inappropriate (e.g. MEF macro model) + deficient internal management instrumentation		No instruments, notion of monitoring seen in negative light (≠ support for management)		Internal management instrumentation (PERAC) recently put in place; results still pending		Non-tested → risk		No instrumentation, no monitoring done

CRITERIA	BURKINA FASO		NIGER		BENIN		MALI		CÔTE D'IVOIRE	
	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks
<b>Monitoring mechanism structure</b>	Structure is theoretically well developed and organized	Mechanism has seized up: irregular meetings at all levels. Some sectoral groups are non-functional	Light structure; concern to build on what already exists		Concern to build on what already exists	Complex mechanism, virtual to date. Being revised		Cumbersome mechanism – multitude of thematic groups	Meets decentralization / deconcentration standard	Cumbersome and complex
<b>Institutional anchoring</b>		Split-up in MEF creating risk and confusion in terms of anchoring	Supported by the office of the Prime Minister; ensures actors' cooperation		Good anchoring with <i>Ministères du Plan et des Finances</i>	Potential rivalries at interdepartmental level	Very good institutional anchoring; no confusion of responsibilities			Potential rivalries at the interdepartmental level
<b>Ownership / Internationalization:</b> - government. - civil society - at local / regional level		Apart from the main directorates in MEF and the two social departments (health, basic education), the PRSP is inappropriate		At government level: seen as outside initiative		Non-tested → risk	A lot of effort goes into informing and sensitizing grass roots actors		Good ownership / internalization at formulation stage	Weak locally and regionally. Implementation non-tested → risk
<b>Linkage between implementation and monitoring</b>		The distinction between the two functions is not clear		The distinction between the two functions is not clear enough	Separation between implementation and monitoring functions			The implementation and monitoring functions are not separate	Separate structures	
<b>Definition of roles</b>	Roles well defined for monitoring mechanism at three levels (L <sub>1</sub> , L <sub>2</sub> , L <sub>3</sub> )	Confusion or ambiguity in missions in terms of the support organizations in the area of statistics (INSD, ONAPAD, STC-PDES) + civil society roles confused. Responsibility and mode of operation of sectoral groups need clarifying.		Roles unclear at all levels of mechanism	Roles defined theoretically	Details of roles have yet to be defined clearly → risk		Actors' role has not been defined outside the government	Main thrusts clarified	

CRITERIA	BURKINA FASO		NIGER		BENIN		MALI		CÔTE D'IVOIRE	
	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks
<b>Functionality and operationality of mechanism</b>		Deficient; Operationality dependent on lower levels		Not yet defined → risk	Mechanism based on successful past experience	Non-tested → risk		Non-tested → risk		Non-tested → risk
<b>Schedule planning</b>	Theoretical schedule well defined	Schedule. Deadline / never met		Not defined		Schedule has yet to be developed in detail → risk		Mechanism not yet tested → risk	On the right track (outputs planning)	
<b>Rivalries</b>		Possible rivalries between INSD, ONAPAD and STC-DGEP		Divergent visions between donors and government		Risk of rivalry between <i>Min de l'Éco. Fin.</i> and <i>Ministère du Plan</i> (Vice president of CNDRP is in MEF – President is in <i>Ministère du Plan</i> )	No known rivalries – MEF exercises trusteeship over the mechanism's essential structures (DNSI, DNP, <i>Dir. Nat. Budget</i> and <i>Cellule technique</i> )			
<b>Suitability / reliability / regularity and comprehensiveness of indicators</b>	Indicators almost finalized → consensus exercise involving the donors and civil society	Indicators not exhaustive (rural development / energy sector)		List not yet finalized	Identification of indicators by a consensus exercise involving donors / departments	List not yet finalized		List of indicators decided upon, but big problem in terms of reliability and comprehensiveness.	Core of indicators identified	
<b>Existence of a capacity enhancement initiative</b>	Initiatives: - WB (CARES) - UNDP (PRGE, or <i>Projet Appui Renf. Gouv. Econ.</i> ) - Coop Suisse (civil society support)	Dispersion of capacity enhancement efforts	For stat., Eurostat program very important		Denmark's capacity enhancement projects		Existence of a Eurostat project		National capacity enhancement project funded by ADB and World Bank	Insufficient (needs strengthening)
<b>Donor coordination</b>	Existence of a joint group for	Big disagreement between the 2		Insufficient cooperation	Coordination of bilateral donors	Insufficient cooperation	Very good donor coordination			Coordination framework non-


CRITERIA	BURKINA FASO		NIGER		BENIN		MALI		CÔTE D'IVOIRE	
	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks	Strengths	Weaknesses/ Risks
	budgetary assistance (SBC)	main donors; institutional assistance fund not operational		(coordination / vision), WB backing off	(Swiss, Denmark, Nether.) for strengthening of OCS	(coordination / vision) with WB in particular	(international assistance review system)			existent except for certain donors

## **Appendix 3**

### **Diagrams of PRSP monitoring / evaluation mechanisms**

# **BENIN**


## Observatoire du Changement Social mechanism in Benin




## **BURKINA FASO**

**PRSP monitoring mechanism**


**Level 1**



**Level 2**




**Level 3**




## **CÔTE D'IVOIRE**

Organization (central level) of institutional framework for production of PRSP operating report




**Organization (decentralized level) of the institutional framework for the production of the PRSP operating report**




**MALI**

**Institutional mechanism for development, implementation and monitoring-evaluation of Mali's PRSP / Main components**




Simplified diagram of PRSP monitoring-evaluation mechanism



**NIGER**

## PRSP IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING-EVALUATION MECHANISM



## **Appendix 4**

### **Current and expected support from donors**

### Current and expected support from donors

Donors	Burkina Faso	Benin	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Niger
<b>WORLD BANK</b>	<p>Technical and financial support for PRSP formulation.</p> <p>Support credit (\$120 million) for the poverty reduction strategy (CASRP).</p> <p>Funding for a national forum on statistical information for poverty monitoring.</p> <p>Support for INSD in carrying out national budget/consumption survey.</p>	<p>Support for PRSP development in the short term.</p> <p>Support for strengthening of public spending monitoring (budgetary reform support program).</p>	<p>Support for poverty reduction capacity enhancement project.</p> <p>Multisectoral project aimed at strengthening capacities in terms of decentralization and deconcentration.</p> <p>Project is at the preparation stage.</p>	<p>Support for improvements in public finance management / budgetary management in the <i>Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances</i> and the <i>Ministère de l'Éducation et de la Santé</i>.</p> <p>Eventual co-funding from WHO and ILO.</p>	<p>Eventual support for PRS monitoring/evaluation</p>
<b>UNDP</b>	<p>Implementation of <i>Projet d'Appui au Renforcement de la Gouvernance Economique</i> (PRGE). The following elements are funded through this:</p> <p>i) <i>Observatoire National de la Pauvreté et du Développement Humain Durable</i> (ONAPAD)</p> <p>ii) <i>Observatoire National de l'Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle</i> (ONEF)</p>	<p>Intends to support the OCS strengthening program through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-support for data retention</li> <li>-dissemination of ECVR2 results</li> <li>-publication of methodological frameworks used to carry out surveys and profiles on poverty</li> </ul> <p>Plans to help implement poverty reduction pilot projects seen as a priority by the government.</p> <p>Would like to get involved in Poverty Reduction Strategy impact assessment.</p>	<p>Funds the <i>Programme de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté</i> (PCLP) and supports a number of undertakings (e.g. <i>Observatoire de la Pauvreté</i>)</p> <p>In the process of preparing a local development support program, which will support decentralization.</p> <p>Funds one of the two projects carried out by <i>Secrétariat National à la Gouvernance et au Renforcement des Capacités</i> which involves decentralization, administrative reform, civil society and rule of law.</p>		<p>Has expressed an interest in eventual support for PRS monitoring-evaluation.</p>

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<b>AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK</b>			Funds the <i>Projet d'Appui à la Gouvernance et au Renforcement des Capacités</i> (PAGRC), which has three parts: -support for rule of law and for decentralization -rationalization of public resource management -program coordination strengthening.		
<b>EUROPEAN UNION</b>		Is active in the poverty reduction program monitoring/evaluation sector through several existing or future programs, chief among them the <i>Programme d'appui régional à l'intégration</i> (PARI), two components of which come under the poverty monitoring/evaluation category. INSAE plans to make technical assistance available to the <i>Ministère de la Santé Publique</i> -institutional support program planned to support the modernization of the <i>Ministère des Finances et de l'Économie</i> , -support for national organizer of the FED ( <i>Ministère des Finances et de l'Économie</i> ).		Support for improvements in public finance management / budgetary management in MEF and the departments of Health and Education.	Strengthen the statistics system for the PRS monitoring system. In this regard, the project plans to: (i) create a poverty monitoring operational framework; (ii) strengthen the technical capacities of the national statistics system; (iii) increase thematic coverage in the priority areas of the PRS; and (iv) support the institutional reorganization of the national statistics system. Has expressed interest in supporting the PRS monitoring-evaluation mechanism once the authorities have specified the type of mechanism they intend to put in place.
<b>DENMARK</b>		Deeply involved in PRSP implementation and monitoring/evaluation.			

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<b>NETHERLANDS</b>		<p>Has funded: assessment of the <i>Observatoire du changement social</i>, and has assumed the expenses of the coordinator and staff of the management cell.</p> <p>-Co-funded with UNDP the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition of ECVR.</p> <p>-In cooperation with the Netherlands, supported a civil society association in organizing mobilization meetings with several NGOs and other civil structures around the PRSP process.</p> <p>Expressed interest in supporting the OCS strengthening program and could team up with it under PERAC. With Denmark, the Netherlands have also funded civil society's participation in the PRSP development and monitoring process.</p>		Support for finalizing the PRSP.	
<b>GERMANY</b>		<p>German Cooperation (GTZ) would like to get involved in the program initially, by providing support for qualitative studies on the impact of policies (application of the QUIM).</p>		Mobilization of some 30 million CFA Francs to equip the Technical Cell and organize workshops.	
<b>FRANCE</b>				Funded the contribution of a macroeconomist and a portion of the Technical Cell support staff.	
<b>SWEDEN</b>				Funded a study on the need to strengthen the	

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				monitoring system.	